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I. INTRODUCTION
Public school funding has been contentiously litigated throughout
the United States, and the Washington Supreme Court has addressed the
inadequacy of public school funding in two pivotal cases: Seattle School
District No. 1 v. State1 and McCleary v. State.2 In both decisions, the
Washington Supreme Court held that the State failed to provide an adequate basic education for its public school students;3 however, in its attempt to remedy the situation, the court took drastically different approaches.
In McCleary v. State, the focus of this Comment, the Washington
Supreme Court held that the State had not met its constitutional obligation to adequately fund K–12 education, and the court ordered the legislature to fully fund the State’s basic education program by 2018.4 Interestingly, the court also retained jurisdiction over the case, and ordered
the legislature to report annually to the court so that it could evaluate
whether the legislature was making meaningful progress towards the
court’s mandate.5 This jurisdictional retention initially caused some strife
among the justices, with several denouncing the judiciary’s oversight of
the legislature as a violation of the separation of powers.6 This Comment
*
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1. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978).
2. McCleary v. State, 269 P.3d 227 (Wash. 2012).
3. See id. at 258; Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 585 P.2d at 94–95. See also infra Part II.
4. McCleary, 269 P.3d at 231. See infra Part II.B.
5. See infra Parts II.B–C.
6. See infra Part II.C.2. Chief Justice Madsen originally opposed the court’s retention of jurisdiction over the McCleary case, and Justice James Johnson authored several dissenting opinions to
orders issued by the majority following the McCleary decision. See infra Parts II.B–C. However,
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argues that this alleged infringement by the court is not a violation of the
separation of powers doctrine—at least not in Washington State. This
Comment further delineates what steps the Washington Supreme Court
may take before blatantly overstepping its constitutionally delineated
bounds.
Part II of this Comment provides a detailed summary of two key
Washington cases pertaining to public school funding: Seattle School
District No. 1 v. State and McCleary v. State. Following the decision in
McCleary, the Washington Supreme Court issued five orders related to
the legislature’s compliance, or lack thereof, with the State’s constitutional mandate.7 These orders, and the subsequent judicial–legislative
tug-of-war, are important not just because of their holdings, but also because of the long-standing debate between the court and the legislature as
to the proper role of the judiciary in the educational finance arena.
Part III analyzes the separation of powers debate generated by the
McCleary court’s decision to retain jurisdiction over the case. It ultimately concludes that the court’s direct oversight of the legislature is not a
violation of the separation of powers doctrine, but is in line with the
court’s jurisprudence. The court’s actions are well within its judicial authority because Washington employs a functional separation of powers
doctrine that permits greater flexibility and communication between the
branches of government.8 For sociopolitical issues of great importance—
such as public school funding adequacy—public policy justifies the use
of this flexible approach.
Part IV discusses the court’s response to the legislature’s noncompliance. Although the McCleary holding does not run afoul of the separation of powers, the court’s enforcement of its mandate could potentially
violate the separation of powers doctrine. Part V concludes.
II. BACKGROUND
The Washington State Constitution asserts that “[i]t is the paramount duty of the state to make ample provision for the education9 of all
children residing within its borders.”10 Therefore, the State has a judicialJustice Johnson is no longer a Washington Supreme Court justice, and the recent contempt order was
unanimously decided.
7. See infra Part II.C.
8. See infra Part III.B.
9. The trial court declined to address definitively the terms “ample,” “provision,” and “education,” opting instead to utilize these words “as guidelines for giving the Legislature the greatest
possible latitude to participate in the full implementation of the constitutional mandate.” Seattle Sch.
Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 93 (Wash. 1978).
10. WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
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ly enforceable and affirmative duty to provide for the education of all K–
12 public school students.11 Because the constitution asserts that this duty
is “paramount,”12 the obligation to adequately provide for Washington
schoolchildren is accorded an elevated status.13 Examination of the
Washington State Constitution reveals that the framers specified only
one state function as a paramount duty within the entire document—the
State’s duty to provide for the education of its resident children.14 Evidently, the Washington Constitutional Convention placed great emphasis
on the education of children residing within the state’s borders.15 The
following cases illustrate how the court has interpreted this paramount
duty.
A. Seattle School District No. 1 v. State
In Seattle School District No. 1 v. State, the Washington Supreme
Court held that the legislature failed to meet its constitutional obligation
to adequately fund public schools.16 Prior to the decision, public schools
in Seattle were forced to rely on special levy elections to supplement
school funding because the legislature did not appropriate sufficient revenue to fund annual educational programs.17 This reliance on special levy
elections created a precarious financial situation for public schools. Although school districts could receive additional funding through levy
elections, “voters [were] not required to approve the request.”18 Additionally, special excess levy elections could only be brought twice annually; upon failure of the second election, the school district was forced to
operate with the inadequate funds provided by the legislature.19 In 1975,
after two failed special excess levy proposals, parents of children enrolled in the Seattle School District brought a civil suit alleging that the
State had failed to uphold its constitutional obligation to provide for the
education of its resident schoolchildren.20
11. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 585 P.2d at 85.
12. Id. “‘Paramount’ is not a mere synonym of ‘important.’ Rather, it means superior in rank,
above all others, chief, preeminent, supreme, and in fact dominant.” Id. at 91.
13. See McCleary v. State, 269 P.3d 227, 232 (Wash. 2012).
14. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 585 P.2d at 85.
15. See id. at 91 (“Theodore L. Stiles, a member of the 1889 constitutional convention wrote:
‘No other state has placed the common school on so high a pedestal. . . . But the convention was
familiar with the history of school funds in the older states, and the attempt was made to avoid the
possibility of repeating the tale of dissipation and utter loss.’”).
16. See id. at 99.
17. Id. at 77–78.
18. Id. at 78.
19. Id.
20. Id.
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The court found that during the 1975–1976 academic year, 40% of
students in Washington attended “levy loss districts.”21 The lack of funding forced levy loss districts to reduce teaching staff, subject offerings,
and security personnel.22 Additionally, these districts had to cut the
budget for fundamental teaching supplies—including textbooks.23 This
financial uncertainty created a gradual decline in public school efficacy;
as one scholar noted, a “pattern of boom and bust economic swings creates havoc with educational opportunity.”24
Furthermore, the court found evidence that suggested this levy system was patently prejudicial to children in low socioeconomic communities because special excess levies depend on the assessed property valuations within a particular district.25 Presumably, urban communities with
higher property valuation were more likely to raise sufficient funds
through special excess levies than rural communities with lower property
valuation.26 The court thus held that the State’s duty to make ample provision for the education of resident children was not constitutionally satisfied by the authorization of special excess levy requests.27 The legislature must make sufficient provision for basic education through appropriation or “dependable and regular tax source[s].”28 The court held that
special excess levy funds were neither.
Next, the court determined that it was the judiciary’s duty “to construe and interpret the word ‘education’ by providing broad constitutional guidelines”; however, it was the legislature’s duty “to give specific
substantive content to the word [education] and to the program it deems
necessary to provide that ‘education’ within the broad guidelines.”29
Therefore, the court mandated that the legislature define “basic education”30 and fund Washington’s basic education program—without the use
21. Id.
22. Id. at 98.
23. Id.
24. Michael A. Rebell, Safeguarding the Right to a Sound Basic Education in Times of Fiscal
Constraint, 75 ALB. L. REV. 1855, 1861 (2012).
25. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 585 P.2d at 98–99.
26. See id.
27. Id. at 99.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 95.
30. Id. The State had not previously defined basic education; therefore, the trial court relied on
three ad hoc definitions of basic education, ultimately concluding that state funding was insufficient
to satisfy any one of the three proposed definitions. McCleary v. State, 269 P.3d 227, 232 (Wash.
2012) (discussing Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 585 P.2d at 71). The Washington Supreme Court did
provide a broad guideline of what constituted education, stating that education “must prepare our
children to participate intelligently and effectively in our open political system to ensure that system’s survival. It must prepare them to exercise their First Amendment freedoms both as sources and
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of special excess levies31—no later than July 1, 1981.32 The court, however, did not direct the legislature as to how it should accomplish these
directives, stating, “While the Legislature must act pursuant to the constitutional mandate to discharge its duty, the general authority to select
the means of discharging that duty should be left to the Legislature.”33
Finally, the Washington Supreme Court overturned the trial court’s
decision to retain jurisdiction, finding it “inconsistent with the assumption that the Legislature will comply with the judgment and its constitutional duties.”34 The court stated that it had “every confidence [that] the
Legislature will comply fully with the duty mandated by [the constitution].”35 Despite the court’s confidence in the legislature’s efforts, thirty
years after Seattle School District No. 1, the Washington Supreme Court
once again held that the State had failed to adequately fund basic education.36 After a second failure, however, the court was unwilling to place
its blind faith in the legislature once again.
B. McCleary v. State
In McCleary v. State, parents of schoolchildren in the Seattle
School District again challenged the adequacy of public school funding.37 The Washington Supreme Court found that after Seattle School
District No. 1 was decided, the legislature had defined basic education as
mandated.38 However, the funding allocated by the legislature did not
correlate with the actual cost of providing students with the “education”
advanced by the legislature.39 Consequently, during the thirty-some years
following Seattle School District No. 1, Washington school districts in-

receivers of information; and, it must prepare them to be able to inquire, to study, to evaluate and to
gain maturity and understanding.” Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 585 P.2d at 94 (citations omitted).
31. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 585 P.2d at 98–99. Although the court held that schools must not
be forced to rely on levies in order to fund basic education, the court expressly indicated that levies
might be brought to fund enrichment programs that go beyond basic education. Id.
32. Id. at 105.
33. Id. at 96.
34. Id. at 105.
35. Id.
36. See McCleary v. State, 269 P.3d 227, 261 (Wash. 2012).
37. Id. at 230.
38. ESHB 2261 redefined basic education by outlining educational standards in terms of: (1) an
instructional program of basic education, (2) an institutional program for detained juveniles, and (3)
student transportation, in addition to providing instruction regarding standardized testing, highly
capable programs, remediation, transitional bilingual education, and special education programs. See
id. at 241–42. Furthermore, ESHB 2261 added voluntary full-day kindergarten to the basic education
program. Id.
39. Id. at 253–54.
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creasingly relied on levies to supplement state funding40—an eerily reminiscent cycle.
In McCleary, the State argued that the basic education program was
fully funded according to the Basic Education Act, which stated that
“education shall be considered to be fully funded by those amounts of
dollars appropriated by the legislature.”41 As the court noted, however,
this provision essentially “allow[ed] the State to maintain the appearance” of a fully funded basic education program, when in actuality the
program was grossly underfunded.42 Levy funds were once again used to
support basic education in an attempt to “fill the gap” between state appropriations and the actual cost of providing basic education.43 In a stern
pronouncement, the court reiterated that “[r]eliance on levy funding to
finance basic education was unconstitutional 30 years ago in Seattle
School District, and it is unconstitutional now.”44 The court held once
again that the State could not rely on local excess levies or federal funding to meet its constitutional obligation to provide ample provision for
the education of schoolchildren.45
After McCleary was filed in the trial court, the State initiated a
comprehensive review of K–12 funding, and before trial was concluded,
the legislature passed ESHB 2261.46 ESHB 2261 defines the resources
and offerings that the legislature believes are necessary to give all students the opportunity to meet state educational standards.47 The legislature intended to fully implement the reforms in ESHB 2261 no later than
2018.48 However, the legislature failed to adequately fund ESHB 2261.49
Although substantial evidence showed that state allocations had fallen
short of the actual cost of implementing the basic education program,50
the court was encouraged by the intent of ESHB 2261, stating that it was
a “promising reform program.”51
The court noted that because the duty to provide ample education
for public school students was imposed upon the State, as opposed to the

40. Id.
41. Id. at 254.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 258.
44. Id.
45. See id. at 257–58, 261.
46. Id. at 241.
47. Id. at 241–43.
48. Id. at 243.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 260.
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legislature only,52 the constitution expressly contemplated shared powers
among the three coordinate branches in deciding public education matters.53 However, although the legislative, executive, and judicial branches
share the responsibility to provide an ample education for resident students, the judiciary alone is responsible for interpreting constitutional
provisions, as it is “emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is.”54 This is true “even when that interpretation serves as a check on the activities of another branch or is contrary to the view of the constitution taken by another branch.”55
Additionally, the court observed that article IX, section 1 of the
Washington State Constitution confers on resident schoolchildren a “positive constitutional right to an amply funded education.”56 A positive
constitutional right is realized only when the government acts, as opposed to a negative constitutional right, “which can only be realized in
the absence of governmental interference.”57 Thus, analysis of a negative
constitutional right asks whether the legislature or executive has “overstepped its authority under the constitution,” whereas analysis of a positive constitutional right asks “whether the State has done enough.”58 Furthermore, positive constitutional rights are those that “the State cannot
‘invade[] or impair[],’” as opposed to negative constitutional rights,
which can be impaired “upon showing a compelling state interest.”59
In the past, positive constitutional rights were often deemed unenforceable, nonjusticiable political questions, and judicial enforcement of
these rights would usually constitute a violation of the separation of
powers doctrine.60 However, state courts have increasingly regarded the-

52. “It is the paramount duty of the state to make ample provision for the education of all children residing within its borders . . . .” WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
53. See McCleary, 269 P.3d at 246–47.
54. Id. at 246 (quoting Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 83 (Wash. 1978) (language originally from Marbury v. Madison)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
55. Id. (quoting Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 585 P.2d at 83) (internal quotation marks omitted).
56. McCleary, 269 P.3d at 231.
57. Jonathan Feldman, Separation of Powers and Judicial Review of Positive Rights Claims:
The Role of State Courts in an Era of Positive Government, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 1057, 1057 n.2 (1993)
(emphasis added) (citing Susan F. Appleton, Beyond the Limits of Reproductive Choice: The Contributions of the Abortion-Funding Cases to Fundamental-Rights Analysis and to the Welfare-Rights
Thesis, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 721, 734–43 (1981)). An example of a negative right would be the right
to free speech, while a positive right would be the right to income. Id. at 1072. See also Burt
Neuborne, Foreword: State Constitutions and the Evolution of Positive Rights, 20 RUTGERS L.J.
881, 883 n.12 (1989).
58. Feldman, supra note 57, at 1058–59.
59. McCleary, 269 P.3d at 248 (quoting Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 585 P.2d at 92 n.13).
60. Feldman, supra note 57, at 1058–59.
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se positive constitutional rights as capable of judicial interpretation.61 In
McCleary, the court found that the positive constitutional right to an adequate education is capable of judicial interpretation and that “federal limits on judicial review . . . are inappropriate.”62 Based on these considerations, a majority of the court determined that it was necessary to retain
jurisdiction over the case to ensure that the State fulfilled its paramount
duty to provide for the education of all Washington public school students.63 The majority emphasized that by retaining jurisdiction, an appropriate balance between the judicial and legislative functions could be
obtained. As such, the court rightly deferred the means for implementing
the State’s constitutional requirements under article IX, section 1 to the
legislature, while ensuring that the court was able to directly monitor
proposed remedies.64
Although the court expressed some hesitation in its decision to retain jurisdiction, it was ultimately unwilling to risk another thirty-year
cycle of failed basic education programs. It stated, “This court cannot
idly stand by as the legislature makes unfulfilled promises for reform.”65
The court recognized the troubling economic situation faced by the State
(and the nation as a whole) and determined that it did not want to take a
wait-and-see approach to the legislative reforms passed while McCleary
was awaiting appeal.66 The court also emphasized the positive aspects of
retaining jurisdiction, namely promoting cooperation between the
branches of government and fostering dialogue throughout the implementation of necessary reforms.67 While recognizing the complexity of
the forthcoming issues, the court refused to “throw up its hands and offer
no remedy at all.”68 Therefore, the court held:
The State has failed to meet its duty under article IX, section 1 by
consistently providing school districts with a level of resources that
falls short of the actual costs of the basic education program. The
legislature recently enacted sweeping reforms to remedy the deficiencies in the funding system, and it is currently making progress
toward phasing in those reforms. We defer to the legislature’s chosen means of discharging its article IX, section 1 duty, but the judi-

61. Id.
62. McCleary, 269 P.3d at 248.
63. Id. at 231.
64. Id. at 261.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 260.
67. Id. at 261.
68. Id.
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ciary will retain jurisdiction over the case to help ensure progress in
the State’s plan to fully implement education reforms by 2018.69

Not all of the justices approved of the majority’s decision to retain
jurisdiction. Chief Justice Madsen agreed that the State had failed to
meet its duty to adequately fund basic education under the Washington
State Constitution, but she maintained that the legislature was responsible for implementing the court’s mandate.70 As a result, it was the court’s
duty to exercise judicial restraint.71
Chief Justice Madsen argued that the precedent set in Seattle School
District No. 1 supported judicial restraint because the court had previously deferred to the legislature on how to implement the law regarding public school funding.72 Additionally, the adoption of specific standards and
guidelines for state funding, including funding for basic education, had
historically been a job for the legislative branch, not the judiciary.73 Finally, Chief Justice Madsen reiterated that the legislature had recently
enacted what the majority itself considered “promising reform.” Consequently, she contended that the judiciary should exercise restraint and
permit the legislature to implement the statutory reforms set forth in
ESHB 2261, without scrutinizing every minute step.74
C. The Aftermath of the McCleary Decision: Reports by the Joint Select
Committee
The court retained jurisdiction over the McCleary case and established a protocol requiring the legislature to report directly to the court
by filing periodic reports—through the Legislative Joint Select Committee on Article IX Litigation75—at the conclusion of each legislative session from 2013 through 2018.76 These reports allow the court to both

69. Id.
70. Id. at 262 (Madsen, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 263.
74. Id.
75. In order to respond to the court’s request, a bipartisan coalition of legislative leaders introduced House Concurrent Resolution 4410, which established the Joint Select Committee on Article
IX Litigation. One of the purposes of the committee is to “provide a point of contact for the Legislature to communicate with the Court . . . .” JOINT SELECT COMM. ON ARTICLE IX LITIG., REPORT TO
THE WASHINGTON STATE SUPREME COURT 4 (2013), available at http://leg.wa.gov/JointCommittees
/AIXLJSC/Documents/ArticleIX2013Report-ReceivedByCourt.pdf.
76. Order of July 18, 2012 at 2, McCleary v. State, 269 P.3d 227 (2012) (No. 84362-7) [hereinafter McCleary Order of July 18, 2012], available at http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/public
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actively monitor the legislature’s implementation of the reforms set out
in ESHB 2261 and evaluate whether the legislature’s actions “show real
and measureable progress toward achieving full compliance with article
IX, section I by 2018.”77 The plaintiffs are also provided an opportunity
to file written comments addressing—and criticizing—the legislature’s
self-reported implementation of reforms and progress.78 The court does
not measure the legislature’s actions against full constitutional compliance with the McCleary holding; rather, the State is required to “demonstrate steady progress according to the schedule anticipated by the enactment of the . . . reforms in ESHB 2261.”79
1. Washington Supreme Court Order of December 20, 2012
The State filed its first mandated report by the Joint Select Committee on Article IX Litigation on September 17, 2012.80 In response, the
court filed an order on December 20, 2012, holding that the legislature
had failed to meet the articulable standards required by the McCleary
decision.81 In a scathing opinion, the court noted that the committee had
done little more than summarize the court’s holding in McCleary: the
committee’s report provided no indication of how the legislature intended to comply with the court’s mandate.82 The court also noted that since
the passage of ESHB 2261 in 2009, significant cuts had been made to
education funding throughout Washington—some of which had been
partially restored but were still below the level that the court held to be
“constitutionally inadequate” in McCleary.83
The court was unsatisfied with the legislature’s efforts overall and
emphasized that “[s]teady progress requires forward movement. Slowing
the pace of funding cuts is necessary, but it does not equate to forward
Upload/Supreme%20Court%20News/mcclearyOrder.pdf (determining that the reports must be filed
after “each legislative session from 2013 through 2018, within 60 days after the final biennial or
supplemental operating budget is signed by the governor”).
77. Id. at 3.
78. Id. at 2.
79. Id. at 3.
80. See generally JOINT SELECT COMM. ON ARTICLE IX LITIG., REPORT TO THE WASHINGTON
STATE SUPREME COURT (2012) [hereinafter JOINT SELECT COMM., 2012 REPORT], available at
http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/publicUpload/Supreme%20Court%20News/mcclearyStateFiling.p
df.
81. Order of Dec. 20, 2012 at 1, McCleary v. State, 269 P.3d 227 (2012) (No. 84362-7) [hereinafter McCleary Order of Dec. 20, 2012], available at http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/public
Upload/Supreme%20Court%20News/84362-7%20-%20McCleary,%20et%20al.%20v.%20State
%2012-20-12%20order%20with%20dissent.pdf.
82. See id. at 1–2.
83. Id. at 2.
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progress; constitutional compliance will never be achieved by making
modest funding restorations to spending cuts.”84 However, the court reiterated, “It continues to be the court’s intention to foster cooperation and
defer to the legislature’s chosen plan to achieve constitutional compliance. But, there must in fact be a plan.”85 Implicit in this statement was
the court’s thinly veiled threat of court-imposed sanctions if the legislature was unable or unwilling to comply with the judicial mandate. The
court ordered the legislature to submit a report at the end of the 2013 legislative session setting forth the legislature’s plan—in sufficient detail to
allow progress to be measured in all areas of education identified in
ESHB 2261—in accordance with the mandate to fully fund basic education by the year 2018.86
Justice James M. Johnson dissented in the order, asserting that the
court violated the separation of powers doctrine.87 According to Justice
Johnson, the legislature is solely responsible for educational funding because, under the Washington State Constitution, “[t]he legislature shall
provide for a general and uniform system of public schools.”88 Therefore,
by regulating the proposed assessments and rejections of the legislature’s
plan to fully fund basic education, the court has, in Justice Johnson’s
opinion, dictated the precise means by which the legislature must act—a
violation of the separation of powers.89 Justice Johnson also noted that
the courts are generally unsuited to remedy policy judgments like those
confronted in McCleary, and as such, the court should presume that the
legislature will continue to act in good faith while implementing the educational reforms set forth in ESHB 2261.90
2. Washington Supreme Court Order of January 9, 2014
Following the State’s second report to the Washington Supreme
Court by the Joint Select Committee on Article IX Litigation, the court
held that the State had taken “meaningful steps” towards amply funding
basic education.91 According to the State’s calculations, a total of $982
84. Id.
85. Id. (internal citation omitted).
86. Id. at 2–3.
87. Dissent to Order of Dec. 20, 2012 at 1, McCleary v. State, 269 P.3d 227 (2012) (No.
84362-7) [hereinafter Dissent to Order of Dec. 20, 2012], available at http://www.courts.wa.gov/
content/publicUpload/Supreme%20Court%20News/84362-7%20-%20McCleary,%20et%20al.%
20v.%20State%2012-20-12%20order%20with%20dissent.pdf.
88. Id. at 5 (alteration in original) (citing WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 2).
89. Id. at 4–5.
90. Id. at 5–6.
91. Order of Jan. 9, 2014 at 2–3, McCleary v. State, 269 P.3d 227 (2012) (No. 84362-7) [hereinafter McCleary Order of Jan. 9, 2014], available at http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/
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million was allocated to K–12 basic education for the 2013–2015 biennium.92 This translated into a 6.7% increase over the prior “constitutionally
inadequate” level of funding.93 The court held that the increased operating budget was “undeniably an improvement” and that “implementing
education reform has become a higher priority for the State, as even a
casual observer of the 2013 legislative session could not fail to appreciate.”94
However, the court also found that these improvements were not
sufficient to conclude that the State had made adequate progress towards
achieving full constitutional compliance.95 Consequently, the court determined that although the “State’s Report demonstrates that it understands what progress looks like, and . . . it has taken some steps toward
fulfilling its constitutional mandate[,]”96 the State was still not on target
to satisfy its constitutional obligations by 2018.97
Once again, the court ordered the legislature to submit a complete
plan for fully implementing its basic education program, this time by
April 30, 2014.98 The plan was required to include a “phase-in schedule”
for full funding of all components of basic education set forth in ESHB
2261.99 Although this imposed an additional obligation upon the legislature, the court noted:
The need for immediate action could not be more apparent. Conversely, failing to act would send a strong message about the State’s
good faith commitment toward fulfilling its constitutional promise.
This court also made a promise to the school children of Washington: We will not “idly stand by as the legislature makes unfulfilled
promises for reform.” Our decision in this case remains fully subject
to judicial enforcement.100

Justice Johnson again dissented, vehemently opposing the “impropriety—indeed unconstitutionality—of the court’s expanding exercise of

publicUpload/Supreme%20Court%20News/20140109_843627_McClearyOrder.pdf (“[U]nlike in
2012, meaningful steps were taken in the 2013 legislative session to address the constitutional imperative of amply providing for basic education.”).
92. Id. at 2.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 3.
95. See id. at 6–7.
96. Id. at 6.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 8.
99. Id.
100. Id. (internal citation omitted).
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continuing jurisdiction . . . .”101 He further asserted that even if the legislature was in violation of the constitution, the judiciary simply does not
possess an adequate enforcement mechanism to compel the legislature to
act.102 Justice Johnson noted,
Because we would be fashioning a tool that has not been constitutionally delegated to us, we are left with far too many unanswered
questions concerning this makeshift authority. It is unclear if we
should hold specific legislators in contempt or the legislative body
as a whole. . . . Because the body of legislators changes over time,
and indeed has changed since the first opinion, it is uncertain which
legislators and which time frame should be held accountable.
....
. . . . We are not—and should not be acting as—managers of the
state coffers.103

Justice Johnson concluded, “These uncertainties undoubtedly indicate
that we are in territory far unsuitable for the judicial hand as defined in
our constitution . . . .”104
3. Washington Supreme Court Order to Show Cause Dated
June 12, 2014
The Joint Select Committee filed its supplementary report by the
deadline mandated.105 In the court’s response, dated June 12, 2014, it
aptly noted that although the legislature “relates what the State urges to
be significant progress,” the report “candidly admits that ‘[t]he Legislature did not enact additional timelines in 2014 to implement the program
of basic education as directed by the Court . . . .’”106 Further, the legislature admitted that “there was no political agreement reached either
among the political caucuses or between the legislative chambers on
101. Dissent to Order of Jan. 9, 2014 at 1, McCleary v. State, 269 P.3d 227 (2012) (No.
84362-7), available at https://www.courts.wa.gov/content/publicUpload/Supreme%20Court%20
News/20140113_843627_McClearyDissentToOrder.pdf.
102. Id. at 6.
103. Id. at 6, 8.
104. Id. at 7.
105. See generally JOINT SELECT COMM. ON ARTICLE IX LITIG., REPORT TO THE WASHINGTON
STATE SUPREME COURT (2014) [hereinafter JOINT SELECT COMM., 2014 REPORT], available at
http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/publicUpload/Supreme%20Court%20News/84362-7%20%20Third%20report%20adopted%20by%20Comm.pdf.
106. Order to Show Cause at 2, McCleary v. State, 269 P.3d 227 (2012) (No. 84362-7) [hereinafter McCleary Order to Show Cause], available at http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/public
Upload/supreme%20Court%20News/84362-7_McCleary_ShowCauseOrder_201406124.pdf (quoting JOINT SELECT COMM., 2014 REPORT, supra note 105, at 27).
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what the full implementation plan should look like . . . .”107 The legislature also offered no evidence to suggest that there would be an agreement
on implementation at the next legislative session.108 Despite these failures, the Joint Select Committee’s report asked the court to acknowledge
that 2015 was the “most critical” year for the legislature in its effort to
meet the judicial mandate and develop a plan to implement a fully funded basic education program.109 In effect, the legislature asked for more
time despite the fact that 2018 is rapidly approaching and a plan to fully
fund education has not yet been established. As a result, the court issued
an order directing the State to show cause as to why it should not be held
in contempt for violating the January 2014 order, and why, if found in
contempt, sanctions or other relief should not be granted.110
4. Washington Supreme Court Order in Response to
September 3, 2014, Show Cause Hearing
On September 11, 2014, following the show cause hearing a week
earlier, the court unanimously held the State in contempt for failure to
submit “a complete plan for fully implementing its program of basic education for each school year between now and the 2017–2018 school
year.”111 Although the State admitted that it did not comply with the
court’s January 2014 order, it urged the court to give the legislature one
more opportunity to develop and enact a plan to fully fund K–12 public
education by 2018.112
Although the court found the legislature in contempt, it also held
“[s]anctions and other remedial measures . . . in abeyance to allow the
State the opportunity to comply with the court’s order during the 2015
legislative session.”113 The court stated that “[i]f by adjournment of the
2015 legislative session the State has not purged the contempt by com107. JOINT SELECT COMM., 2014 REPORT, supra note 105, at 27. The short 60-day session
ended without lawmakers coming to an agreement on a plan. John Higgins, Court Hears Arguments
in McCleary School-Funding Case; Watch Coverage Replay, SEATTLE TIMES (Sept. 2, 2014, 5:00
AM),
http://blogs.seattletimes.com/educationlab/2014/09/02/historic-mccleary-school-fundinghearing-coming-wednesday/.
108. McCleary Order to Show Cause, supra note 106, at 3.
109. JOINT SELECT COMM., 2014 REPORT, supra note 105, at 33.
110. McCleary Order to Show Cause, supra note 106, at 3–4.
111. Order of Sept. 11, 2014 at 4, McCleary v. State, 269 P.3d 227 (2012) (No. 84362-7) [hereinafter McCleary Order of Sept. 11, 2014], available at http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/Public
Upload/Supreme%20Court%20News/84362-7%20order%20-%209-11-2014.pdf. Pursuant to the
January 9, 2014, order, the State was required to include a “phase-in schedule for fully funding each
of the components of basic education.” McCleary Order of Jan. 9, 2014, supra note 91, at 8.
112. McCleary Order of Sept. 11, 2014, supra note 111, at 2.
113. Id. at 4–5.
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plying with the court’s order, the court will reconvene to impose sanctions and other remedial measures as necessary.”114 Additionally, the
court provided that should the legislature fail to comply with the court’s
order by the adjournment of the 2015 session, the State must file “a
memorandum explaining why sanctions or other remedial measures
should not be imposed.”115 Thus, the court has given the legislature yet
another attempt to fund Washington public schools with yet another opportunity to explain if it again fails.
III. CRITIQUE
School funding litigation often blurs the traditional roles of the judicial and legislative branches because “[l]itigation over educational adequacy . . . places the judiciary in the position of rendering value judgments as to legislative appropriation levels . . . and this requirement raises significant separation of powers concerns.”116 This blurred line between the judicial and legislative functions of state governments raises
concerns that courts are determining issues based on policy considerations more appropriately within the confines of the legislature—not the
judiciary.117
A. Nationwide Public School Funding Litigation
Because the U.S. Supreme Court has stated that education is not a
fundamental right under the U.S. Constitution,118 the ultimate forum for
challenging a state’s educational program is the state’s highest court.119
Therefore, “state courts provide the only judicial recourse for plaintiffs
seeking . . . adequate funding for public education.”120 As of December
2014, only five states had avoided litigation challenging the constitution-

114. Id. at 5.
115. Id.
116. Scott R. Bauries, Is There an Elephant in the Room?: Judicial Review of Educational
Adequacy and the Separation of Powers in State Constitutions, 61 ALA. L. REV. 701, 704 (2010).
117. See id. at 705–06.
118. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37 (1973). The United States
Supreme Court found that education was not among the basic fundamental rights protected under the
Constitution either explicitly or implicitly, and thus was not subject to strict judicial scrutiny. Id. at
37–39. Because education “presents a myriad of ‘intractable economic, social, and even philosophical problems[,]’” the Court felt that the imposition of “inflexible constitutional restraints” would
inhibit the ability of state legislatures to respond to complex problems confronted in educational
reform. Id. at 42–43 (citation omitted).
119. See Rebell, supra note 24, at 1865.
120. Justin Abbasi, Adequate Education in Washington State: Money, Rights, and Power 3
(Dec. 29, 2014) (unpublished paper) (on file with author).
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ality of public school funding,121 and educational adequacy litigation was
pending in eleven states.122 From 1989 to 2014, courts in twenty-two
states issued decisions either affirming or enforcing the rights of students
to an adequate basic education, while fourteen state courts awarded state
defendant victories.123 Most of the state courts that returned verdicts in
favor of state defendants did so on the ground that public school funding
is a legislative concern and is nonjusticiable.124
Although the early 1990s saw an overwhelming amount of school
funding litigation, courts have recently rejected such litigation in an attempt to broaden the demarcation between the judiciary and the legislature.125 Between 1989 and 2005, school funding litigation plaintiffs won
more than 75% of cases; however, in recent years, the scale has tipped
heavily towards legislative deference (ultimately amounting to a victory
for the state defendant).126 For example,
[S]ince 2005, adequacy plaintiffs [have] struggled to surmount the
courts’ unease with adjudicating these cases. Plaintiffs’ adequacy
claims were dismissed before ever reaching trial in nine of the nineteen decisions handed down between 2005 and 2008. By contrast,
only five courts had refused to hear adequacy claims in the preceding sixteen years.127

121. NAT’L EDUC. ACCESS NETWORK, LITIGATIONS CHALLENGING CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
K-12 FUNDING IN THE 50 STATES (2014), available at ahttp://schoolfunding.info/wpcontent/uploads/2011/07/Litigations-Challenging-Constitutionality-of-K-12-Funding10.pdf. The five
states that have never had a constitutional challenge to K–12 funding are Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa,
Nevada, and Utah. Id.
122. Education Adequacy Liability Decisions Since 1989, NAT’L EDUC. ACCESS NETWORK
(2014), http://schoolfunding.info/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/School-Funding-Adequacy-Decisions
-by-Outcome-.pdf.
123. Id.
124. See Bauries, supra note 116, at 746. Before the merits of the plaintiff’s case can be heard
by the court, the plaintiff must first survive a motion to dismiss by the defendant that school funding
is a legislative function and is thus nonjusticiable; the plaintiff must effectively argue that the state’s
constitution provides individuals the right to “adjudicate educational adequacy.” Vinay Harpalani,
Note, Maintaining Educational Adequacy in Times of Recession: Judicial Review of State Education
Budget Cuts, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 258, 259–60 (2010).
125. See Julia A. Simon-Kerr & Robynn K. Sturm, Justiciability and the Role of Courts in
Adequacy Litigation: Preserving the Constitutional Right to Education, 6 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 83,
84 (2010).
126. Id. at 85.
127. Id.
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cond, under a functional approach to the separation of powers doctrine—
as opposed to a traditional, formal separation of powers doctrine—state
judiciaries possess great flexibility when reviewing the actions of coordinate branches of government.130
In Seattle School District No. 1, the court summarily dismissed the
argument that adequacy school funding claims were nonjusticiable.131
The court held that because article IX, section 1 of the constitution required interpretation before the extent of the State’s duty to provide for
the education of its resident students could be determined, there was no
separation of powers issue.132 Additionally, although the court has previously articulated a justiciability test, it has not hesitated to disregard this
test when confronted with an issue of “great public interest.”133 Finally,
the Washington Supreme Court utilizes an expansive exception to mootness, which permits cases of “continuing and substantial public interest”
to be brought even if the court cannot provide the relief sought by the
party or even provide effective relief of a general nature.134 Therefore,
although McCleary would likely have been rejected by a federal court as
a nonjusticiable political question, the Washington Supreme Court elected to hear the case because it presented an ongoing issue of public importance.
Further, in Washington, courts have the “sole and final say in interpreting the Constitution on behalf of all three branches of government . . . .”135 Although the court unquestionably held that it was well
within its judicial authority to interpret the constitutional provisions at
issue in McCleary, it attempted to placate the legislature by acknowledging that the determination of whether an action of the executive or legislative branch exceeds its authority is “a delicate exercise in constitutional
interpretation . . . .”136 The court also noted that each branch of government is required to “take . . . account” of the other branches’ powers; no
branch of government is “intended to operate with absolute independence.”137 Obviously, the extent to which each branch of government

analysis and criticism by scholars, jurists, and others for almost two hundred years.” H.R. 2060, 55th
Leg., Reg. Sess. § 3(2) (Wash. 1997).
130. See Feldman, supra note 57, at 1087–88.
131. See Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 80–84 (Wash. 1978).
132. Id. at 88–89.
133. See Philip A. Talmadge, Understanding the Limits of Power: Judicial Restraint in General Jurisdiction Court Systems, 22 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 695, 717–18 (1999).
134. Id. at 719.
135. Id. at 702.
136. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 585 P.2d at 84.
137. Id. at 88.
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played an equal role in the determination of the McCleary case is subject
to debate.
Finally, a more flexible approach to the separation of powers doctrine, commonly called a “functional approach,” is utilized in Washington.138 There is no formal separation of powers provision in the Washington Constitution, and the courts have traditionally viewed the separation
of powers doctrine as “grounded in flexibility and practicality” without
broad demarcation “beyond which one branch may not tread.”139 The
lack of a formal doctrine does not mean that there is no division between
the three branches of government; rather, “one branch will violate [the]
separation of powers if its activity ‘threatens the independence or integrity or invades the prerogatives of another’” branch.140
By contrast, the formal separation of powers doctrine emphasizes
sharp division between the three branches of government and reinforces
the view that each branch should be free from the influence of the others.141 Under this approach, the powers and functions of the different
branches of government are not flexible, but rigid, and do not shift in
response to historical and political concerns and conditions.142
In McCleary, the court has seemingly adopted a functional approach.143 A functional view of the separation of powers doctrine “emphasizes efficiency of function rather than strict separation.”144 This approach provides for more flexible judicial review than the formal separation of powers doctrine.145 According to some, this approach is also more
likely to result in higher standards of judicial review.146 As an illustration:
The functional approach aims to allocate the tasks of government to
those organs most likely to perform them well and recognizes that
the allocation of power between branches of government must remain somewhat fluid in order to respond to changing political conditions. Rather than creating bright lines between the workings of
the different branches of government, a functional view of separation of powers stress[es] the ambiguities of the distribution powers
138. Talmadge, supra note 133, at 712.
139. Id.
140. Abbasi, supra note 120, at 14 (quoting Zylstra v. Piva, 539 P.2d 823, 827 (Wash. 1975)).
141. See Harpalani, supra note 124, at 264.
142. Id.
143. Abbasi, supra note 120, at 15 (functionalist approach evidenced by the court’s retention of
jurisdiction and requirement of yearly updates by the legislature).
144. Harpalani, supra note 124, at 264.
145. Id. at 261.
146. Id. at 266.
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and embrace[s] flexible principles governing what authority each
branch of government can properly exercise.147

State constitutions often provide for direct judicial review of the
legislature; thus, the judiciary frequently plays a heightened role in state
governments.148 Additionally, institutional concerns that support more
formal separation of powers are often not present in the state context, as
state courts are more likely to have direct political accountability due to
the election of state judges.149 Finally, state governments are often inherently flexible due to the broad plenary power possessed by state legislatures, as opposed to the federal legislative branch, whose powers are specifically enumerated in the U.S. Constitution.150
Although a functional approach to the separation of powers provides more flexibility than a formal approach, there are still clearly demarcated lines that the judiciary may not cross. For example, the “determination of specific remedies and the allocation of funds . . . [are] legislative or executive functions.”151 However, the court has the capacity to
determine whether these specific remedies or allocations are constitutional.152 Thus, although the judiciary is the ultimate interpreter of the
constitution and is responsible for setting constitutional standards, it is
unable to implement potentially effective remedies or allocate requisite
funds because these are traditionally legislative duties.153 In public school
funding cases, this creates a cycle within which the same (or substantially similar) claims are repeatedly brought before the judiciary: the judiciary declares the legislature’s remedial action unconstitutional, and the
legislature attempts to design an appropriate remedy, which the court
subsequently declares unconstitutional as well.154 This oscillation between the legislature and the judiciary––in which the legislature enforces
a remedy in response to a judicial mandate and the court then holds the
remedy unconstitutional, requiring the legislature to return to the drawing
board—often results in expensive and protracted litigation where no effective remedy is implemented and the state’s educational system ultimately remains broken.155

147. Id. at 264–65 (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
148. Feldman, supra note 57, at 1066–67.
149. Harpalani, supra note 124, at 266–67.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 260–61.
152. See id. at 261.
153. Id. at 260–61.
154. See id. at 261.
155. See id.
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By retaining jurisdiction and requiring that the legislature report directly to the court, the State and the court are able to maintain an open
dialogue about the constitutionality of the legislature’s proposed remedies without resorting to continuous litigation. The court’s functional
approach to the separation of powers permits the judicial, legislative, and
executive branches to engage in a system of allocation that focuses less
on what specific “roles” each branch should take and instead permits the
government to work together to achieve a desirable result for the state as
a whole.
IV. PROPOSAL
Under a functional separation of powers doctrine, the judiciary has
the authority to uphold positive constitutional rights and order the legislature’s compliance; however, there are still critical concerns as to how
the court can remedy the legislature’s noncompliance. One of the most
problematic aspects of sociopolitical litigation is the inherent difficulty in
fashioning and enforcing suitable remedies.156 Additionally, the negative
implications of judicial activism can potentially outweigh the benefits
sought in public school funding cases, especially where the ultimate
goals are unattainable.157
The McCleary court is currently in a difficult position. Ultimately,
it must wait and see if the legislature will purge the contempt order by
the adjournment of the 2015 legislative session. If the legislature does
not move swiftly to purge the contempt order, the legitimacy of all three
branches of government could be undermined. The court has indicated
that should the legislature fail to purge the contempt order, it will act
quickly; if the State fails to agree on a plan by the session’s last day, it
must provide a written explanation to the court the very next day.158 Of
course, at this point, the judiciary will have to enforce a remedy. However, what is an appropriate remedy?
Plaintiffs in the McCleary case have proposed a number of potential
remedies including: (1) imposing monetary contempt sanctions against
legislative branch officials; (2) prohibiting government expenditures on
matters unrelated to public school funding until the State complies with
the court’s constitutional ruling; (3) ordering the legislature to pass legislation funding specific amounts; (4) prohibiting the State from limiting
educational programs to less than all eligible students in a given grade
156. See Talmadge, supra note 133, at 698.
157. For example, the ultimate goal of an “adequate” public school education may be unattainable if the state legislature does not possess funds sufficient to remedy the constitutional violation.
158. McCleary Order of Sept. 11, 2014, supra note 111, at 5.
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level; (5) ordering the sale of state property to fund constitutional compliance; and (6) issuing a writ of mandamus to compel performance.159
State courts that have upheld constitutional challenges to adequate
public school funding have faced difficulty in their attempts to enforce a
feasible remedy. For example, in DeRolph v. State,160 the Ohio Supreme
Court ruled in favor of the plaintiff school districts three times, holding
that Ohio had failed to provide a “thorough and efficient” system of education in violation of the state constitution.161 However, the court did not
impose consequences when the legislature repeatedly failed to sufficiently increase education funding.162 In December 2002, the court decided
that it would no longer retain jurisdiction.163
Other state courts have threatened injunction in order to coerce legislative compliance with educational funding mandates. Illustratively, in
Robinson v. Cahill,164 the New Jersey Supreme Court issued an injunction prohibiting officials from spending funds in support of public
schools until the legislature met its constitutional mandate to provide a
“thorough and efficient” education for public school students.165 The
court subsequently ordered the closure of public schools over the summer after the legislature failed to sufficiently increase educational funding.166 After an eight-day closure, the legislature adopted a state income
tax.167
Similarly, in 2005, the Kansas Supreme Court ordered the legislature to increase funding for K–12 education, and the court set a deadline
after which all public schools would be shut down if funding was not
provided.168 In response, the legislature complied and approved the addi159. Plaintiff/Respondents’ 2012 Post-Budget Filing at 42–43, McCleary v. State, 269 P.3d
227 (2012) (No. 84362-7), available at https://www.courts.wa.gov/content/publicUpload/Supreme
%20Court%20News/McClearyPostBudgetFiling2012.pdf.
160. See generally DeRolph v. State, 780 N.E.2d 529 (Ohio 2002); DeRolph v. State, 754
N.E.2d 1184 (Ohio 2001); DeRolph v. State, 728 N.E.2d 993 (Ohio 2000); DeRolph v. State, 677
N.E.2d 733 (Ohio 1997).
161. DeRolph, 780 N.E.2d at 529 (summarizing the litigation).
162. See Shadya Yazback, Note, School Financing in Ohio Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow:
Searching for a “Thorough and Efficient” System of Public Schools, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 671,
675–76, 679, 683, 684–85 (2007).
163. DeRolph, 780 N.E.2d at 537.
164. Robinson v. Cahill, 287 A.2d 187 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1972).
165. Id. at 192, 217; see also Abbasi, supra note 120, at 16.
166. Donna Gordon Blankinship, Legislature in Contempt over Education Funding,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 11, 2014, 8:32 PM), http://www.king5.com/story/news/local/olympia/
2014/09/11/legislature-washington-supreme-court-education/15447555/.
167. Id.
168. John Higgins, Washington’s Pending Showdown on School Funding: Legislature vs.
Supreme
Court,
SEATTLE
TIMES
(Feb.
14,
2015,
8:27
PM),
http://old.seattletimes.com/html/education/2025702421_mcclearystatecomparsionsxml.html.
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tional funding before the court’s deadline.169 Unfortunately, these
measures appear to have been only temporary solutions, as both Kansas
and New Jersey have faced subsequent educational funding litigation.170
Similar to the approach taken in New Jersey and Kansas, the
McCleary plaintiffs suggested that Washington public schools be shut
down until the legislature complies with the court’s mandate. Closing all
public schools until the legislature appropriates additional funding is a
risky venture that “assumes no education is preferable to the education
students . . . are currently receiving.”171 In New Jersey, public schools
were only closed for a short period before the legislature responded, and
in Kansas schools were never closed. However, if the court ordered public schools in Washington to close and the legislature did not increase
funding, “it is [the] schoolchildren who [would be] harmed most directly.”172
The efficacy and constitutionality of several remedies proposed by
the plaintiffs in McCleary are debatable. First, courts have traditionally
hesitated to impose, or even threaten to impose, budgetary allocations.173
This is understandable considering that legislatures have traditionally had
exclusive control over appropriations and budgetary allocations.174 This
is true in Washington; the Washington State Constitution “places the authority for appropriation of funds exclusively in the legislature.”175
Thus, ordering the legislature to pass legislation funding specific
amounts would likely infringe on the legislature’s plenary power of taxation and violate the separation of powers. Directing the legislature to
fund specific amounts for education could also “upset the ‘appropriate
balance’ between deference to the Legislature ‘to determine the precise
means for discharging its article IX, section 1 duty.’”176 In both Seattle
School District No. 1 and McCleary, the court explicitly deferred to the
legislature in determining the means by which the legislature would
169. Id.
170. See id.; New Jersey, NAT’L EDUC. ACCESS NETWORK, http://www.schoolfunding.info/
states/nj/lit_nj.php3 (last updated Mar. 2011).
171. State of Washington’s Opening Brief Addressing Order to Show Cause at 28, McCleary v.
State, 269 P.3d 227 (2012) (No. 84362-7) [hereinafter State’s Brief Addressing Order], available at
https://www.courts.wa.gov/content/publicUpload/supreme%20Court%20News/84362-7_McCleary_
OpeningBrief_20140711.pdf.
172. Id. at 29.
173. See Simon-Kerr & Sturm, supra note 125, at 89.
174. See Talmadge, supra note 133, at 729 (quoting Hillis v. State, Dep’t of Ecology, 932 P.2d
139, 147–48 (Wash. 1997)).
175. Abbasi, supra note 120, at 13 n.61.
176. State’s Brief Addressing Order, supra note 171, at 19 (quoting McCleary v. State, 269
P.3d 227, 261 (Wash. 2012)).
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comply with the court’s mandate.177 It is inadvisable for the court to
abandon this principle of legislative deference at this stage in the litigation. Similarly, the diversion of existing funds to public school education
would necessitate the redirection of funds from other programs. This
would likely come at the expense of higher education, human services, or
both.178 The court has said “[it] would hardly relish being the cause of
distress to people in need or students in [the state’s] universities and colleges.”179
Second, in response to the plaintiffs’ suggestion that the court order
the sale of state property, the State noted that the plaintiffs offered no
examples of any state property that could be sold.180 Further, the sale of
state property would hardly be considered a “‘dependable and regular’
revenue source” from which to fund basic education.181
Third, the imposition of monetary sanctions on individual legislators could potentially be more harmful than helpful because sanctions
could logistically “coerce[] the vote of legislators.”182 Furthermore, a fine
imposed on the State is theoretically more harmful to schoolchildren than
the original suit is beneficial because it would diminish the “funds available to finance compliance with the Court’s remedial order.”183
Finally, although the court does have the authority to issue writs of
mandamus, the writ is not frequently used to control the legislature and is
justified only as an extraordinary remedy.184 Additionally, “writs of
mandamus must be directed at an ‘inferior tribunal, corporation, board or
person.’ The legislature is separate and equal, not inferior to the
Court.”185 Thus, it seems that all of the plaintiffs’ proposed remedies are
insufficient and unlikely to bring about a fully funded public education
system in Washington.
In short, Washington is in uncharted territory. The Washington Supreme Court has never before held the legislature in contempt for failure

177. See McCleary, 269 P.3d at 261; Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 105 (Wash.
1978) (electing not to retain jurisdiction over the parties).
178. See JOINT SELECT COMM., 2012 REPORT, supra note 80, at 22–24; see also PHILIP A.
TALMADGE, WASH. POLICY CTR., LEGAL ANALYSIS: CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF
WASHINGTON SUPREME COURT’S REMEDY IN MCCLEARY V. STATE 11 (2014), available at
http://www.washingtonpolicy.org/sites/default/files/Talmadge-LegalAnalysisMcCleary2.pdf.
179. TALMADGE, supra note 178, at 11.
180. State’s Brief Addressing Order, supra note 171, at 28.
181. Id. (quoting Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 585 P.2d at 79).
182. Id. at 27.
183. Id.
184. Dissent to Order of Dec. 20, 2012, supra note 87, at 2.
185. Id. at 2–3 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 7.16.160 (2014)).
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to obey a court order.186 Many legislators are dissatisfied, to say the least,
with the recent contempt order.187 Consequently, the legislature could
strike back at the court. The legislature could reduce the size of the supreme court, fail to fund judicial services, or propose a constitutional
amendment “to give the Legislature the exclusive authority to define the
courts’ jurisdiction or remedial authority.”188 Furthermore, if the court
does overstep its bounds, it is unlikely the McCleary case will be appealable to the U.S. Supreme Court.189 At that point, the governor of Washington will have to either enforce or abstain from enforcing the court’s
order.190
Although the court unquestionably has the authority to enforce its
own contempt orders “through its inherent, and broad, contempt powers,”191 if the court imposes sanctions against the legislature for failure to
purge the contempt order, it will be difficult to avoid overstepping traditional, judicial bounds. However, although the judiciary arguably risks
damage to its “impartial” reputation by engaging in “judicial activism,”
there is little the court can do after it has ordered the legislature to comply with a judicial mandate.192 Even scholars who maintain that judicial
involvement in sociopolitical controversies is unwarranted often concede
that once the judiciary has inserted itself into the controversy, and is subsequently faced with noncompliance on the part of the legislature, there
is often no alternative but for the judiciary to subsequently “act as a legislative body” in fashioning a remedy.193 Ultimately, the citizens of
Washington will determine which governmental branches, if any, acted
outside their constitutional authority.
V. CONCLUSION
In McCleary, the Washington judiciary embraced an active role in
the determination of educational funding adequacy. The court determined that the best method to guarantee legislative compliance was to
186. Joseph O’Sullivan, Contempt Ruling Ups Ante in Fight to Fund Public Schools, SEATTLE
TIMES (Sept. 12, 2014, 8:52 PM), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/contempt-ruling-upsante-in-fight-to-fund-public-schools/.
187. State’s Brief Addressing Order, supra note 171, at 2–6; see also TALMADGE, supra note
178, at 11.
188. TALMADGE, supra note 178, at 11–12.
189. McCleary does not involve a federal question (the case involves an issue that is governed
by the state constitution) and the parties are not diverse.
190. See Abbasi, supra note 120, at 16 (“Courts rely on the executive branch to implement
orders; an uncooperative governor can render judicial decisions essentially worthless.”).
191. See TALMADGE, supra note 178, at 9.
192. See Talmadge, supra note 133, at 695–96, 731.
193. Id. at 726.
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retain jurisdiction over the matter—enabling the judicial and legislative
branches to engage in open communication while ensuring that the judicial mandate is met. Although the courts do not frequently retain jurisdiction over cases, this procedure does not violate the separation of powers
doctrine in Washington because Washington has historically utilized a
functional approach to the separation of powers. However, the court is in
a perilous predicament because it has very few practical enforcement
methods that may be employed in the event the legislature fails to comply with the court’s ultimate mandate. If the legislature fails to meet its
constitutional obligations, it is likely the judiciary will have to violate its
own constitutional obligations in order to compel the legislature’s compliance—a direct violation of the separation of powers.

